Ahmed Al-Salami
Poet and Writer
More than six decades after the September 26 Revolution, Yemen is still grappling with a struggle that raises the fundamental question: was liberation from the Imamate complete, or is it still an unfinished battle? For Yemenis, that revolution was not merely a historical event, but a decisive moment that freed the country from centuries of Imamate rule and opened the door to the dream of a modern state.
While peoples around the world advanced in building modern states through constitutions, institutions, elections, and the separation of powers, Yemen remained trapped in backward eras under an Imamate system that lasted nearly a thousand years—a system that entrenched ignorance, kept the country outside the course of modernity, and prevented any progress toward freedom, sovereignty, and equal citizenship. In this context, the September 26, 1962 Revolution came to mark a new phase, separating the closed era of the Imamate from the beginnings of a different national project. And although it was besieged from its first moment by internal and external threats, it remains the first serious attempt to sever Yemen’s link with the Imamate and usher it into the age of the modern state.
September was the fruit of long accumulations of frustration and popular awareness, and an expression of a new generation of officers, students, and intellectuals who saw the Imamate as an existential obstacle to any progress. This awareness coincided with the rise of liberation movements in the region, and army officers trained in Egypt played a pivotal role in igniting the revolution, carrying with them the dream of a civil state, constitutional governance, and equal citizenship.
The fall of the Imamate on September 26 was a crushing blow to the idea of “rule by divine decree” and “hereditary Imamate.” It marked a shift toward a national project built on the principle that governance is the right of the people through elected institutions and a constitution defining the relationship between ruler and ruled, not a dynasty claiming a “divine right.” For the first time, education was opened to all after being limited to a few families. Historical accounts note that before the revolution, Taiz had only one modern school, while illiteracy exceeded 90% of the population. Daily life reflected complete isolation: transportation was limited to donkeys and camels, electricity was nonexistent, hospitals were absent, epidemics like cholera claimed lives, and prisons were filled with opponents and tribesmen held as hostages. The revolution came to break this closed circle and open the way for education, health, and development.
To understand the value of the revolution, one must grasp the effect of the Imamate, which ruled Yemen for centuries. It prevented the emergence of a modern state and entrenched a coercive religious legitimacy that allowed no debate; anyone who questioned it faced death by the sword. The Imam monopolized sovereignty for himself and his family, even the decision of succession, to the point of eliminating any family member who opposed him. The significance of the revolution is that it saved Yemenis from a system that rejected the principle of people’s sovereignty over their own decision. There were no elections and no separation of powers: legislative, executive, and judicial authority were all in the Imam’s hands, who considered himself the absolute ruler without oversight or accountability. In contrast, the modern state is founded on popular sovereignty, and this principle alone still unsettles the advocates of the Imamate today.
The modern state is the opposite of that model: it does not grant the ruler sanctity or absolute immunity, but binds him with a constitution and popular oversight. This explains the behavior of those described as the “new heirs of the Imamate” in Sana’a today, where they revive the legacy of the wilaya in a contemporary form, subjecting state institutions to the authority of the “Sayyid Leader,” in a manner resembling the model of Velayat-e Faqih in Iran.
But Yemen’s tragedy is that the republic after 1962 did not succeed in ridding itself of the influence and remnants of the Imamate. The civil war (1962–1970) ended with a reconciliation that brought together republicans and remnants of the Imamate in a power-sharing arrangement. Over the decades, tribal and traditional power centers and war profiteers infiltrated state institutions, turning the republic itself into a hybrid entity incapable of consolidating the model of a civil state. A state that bargains with and submits to these forces cannot be a genuine state of institutions. The republic remained governed by pre-state balances, hostage to figures and notables stronger than the law itself.
Any hope of liberation from the burden of the Imamate, whether in its old form or its modern manifestations, will only be achieved by restoring the goals of the September Revolution: building a modern civil state based on equal citizenship, the separation of powers, and the eradication of class and sectarian privileges. September was never merely a national commemoration, but an ongoing battle. And today, as Yemenis face attempts to revive or reproduce the Imamate past, they have no choice but to uphold the principles of that revolution, which drew the line between centuries of tyranny and the possibility of a modern state. Either Yemenis reclaim their civil republic, or they remain trapped in an endless cycle of despotism.
