Counselor Jamal Abd al-Rahman al-Hadhrami
Since the Treaty of Dhuʿan (Sulh Dhuʿan) on October 9, 1911—ratified by an Ottoman ferman in 1913—between Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, representative of the Zaydi sect, and Ahmed Izzat Pasha, envoy of the Ottoman Sultan, named after the Dhuʿan fortress in the ʿAmran Governorate, it was agreed that:
(The Imam recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the Vilayet of Yemen in exchange for the Ottomans recognizing the Imam’s leadership over the Zaydi community).
Over successive decades, successive governments treated Tihama as a safe card in the pocket of loyalty and dependency, as well as a vast economic and human reservoir. Political systems took advantage of everything Tihama offered, giving back only mere scraps in return.
During this era of conflict and wars between the Ottomans and the British, the Idrisids and the Saudis on one side, and the Mutawakkilite Hashemite Kingdom of Yemen on the other, a war was also waged against the Zaraniq tribe in Beit al-Faqih (Tihama). This tribe was among the first in Yemen to declare its rejection of Imamate rule, under the leadership of resistance hero Sheikh Ahmed Fatini Junaid, his brother Sheikh Ali Ahmed Junaid, and their brave men.
Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din viewed Tihama with classist arrogance and disdain. Armed uprisings against him flared up, lasting for years—until the Republicans rose in the September Revolution of 1962 and toppled the Imamate rule. At that point, Tihama breathed a sigh of relief; its tribes participated in the People’s Army under Sheikh Yahya Mansar, while its national figures and intellectuals such as Ahmed Saʿd Hakami, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Nasr, Yusuf al-Shahari, Dr. Hassan Makki, and others, became engaged.
Yet Tihama remained cast aside—consigned to the shelves of neglect and oblivion: a lung that supplied the country with the air of the outside world, only to be repaid with the smoke of deprivation and domination. It was one of the most important regions generating significant revenue for Yemen, given its strategic location on the Red Sea; the port of al-Hudaydah (the second largest after Aden, built by the Soviet Union but finally destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in 2024 and 2025); and its immense wealth of fisheries and livestock that supplied Yemen’s market and neighboring countries. In addition, Tihama had a crucial international highway connecting Yemen with Saudi Arabia, until it collapsed in March 2015.
Migration and Its Dimensions
This political environment over decades drove massive emigration from Tihama to countries of the Gulf.
In 1970, there were about 1,234,000 migrants, including 90,082 from Tihama.
By 2020, due to war and conflict, the number had risen to 2,338,900, of whom 170,740 were from Tihama.
The al-Hudaydah Governorate remained an expelling region, replacing its native population with forces of conflict and war. Migration was highly dependent on the Yemeni governments’ relations with host countries—fluctuating positively or negatively based on those ties, or triggered by internal conflicts, poverty, and famine (as in the 1970s and after Yemen’s fragmentation post-2014). Other external shocks such as the Gulf War, the Somali civil war of 1992, and the 1973 oil boom also left their mark, spurring large-scale labor migration in search of livelihoods in neighboring states.
The Role of Tihama Migration in the Revolution
The migration from Tihama had both external and internal drivers, and it left its imprint on Yemeni life by shaping a revolutionary consciousness that significantly contributed to the September 26, 1962 Revolution.
Migrants provided both financial and in-kind contributions, formed revolutionary and political committees abroad, spread awareness of the revolution’s goals, and mobilized international and domestic public opinion in its favor. They set up donation funds for the war effort, channeling their support through Yemeni traders in neighboring countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia.
Through their influence abroad as individuals and organized groups, they not only garnered international support but also financed major urban development in Yemen: schools, healthcare facilities, and infrastructure projects—all funded largely through remittances.
This progress, however, collapsed after 2014, as the country fell into cycles of political power struggles, resource competition, and foreign interventions that dragged Yemen back into civil war. How strikingly today resembles yesterday! The Yemeni citizen remains alienated, estranged from his homeland, while foreign powers continue to manipulate Yemen’s security and exploit its resources.
Outlook
Yemen’s future requires an inclusive national project that unites the army, strengthens its capabilities, and enables it to protect the country and preserve its territorial integrity. Only then can Yemen break free from the cycle of dependency, marginalization, and forced migration.
